In the Nyāya school of Indian philo-sophy, a material fallacy is technically called ‘hetvābhāsa,’ which literally means that a hetu or reason which appears as, but really is not, a valid reason. Out of the five hetvābhāsas generally listed, ‘bādhita’ is the last.

Consider the sentence agniranuṣṇaḥ dravyatvāt, ‘Fire is cold, since it is a substance’. Here anuṣṇatva or coldness is the sādhya (major term) and dravya or substance is the hetu (middle term). The non-existence of coldness, nay more, the existence of hotness, is perceived in fire by our sense of touch. So, we have to reject hetu or the middle term, dravyatva (being a substance), as it is bādhita or contradicted by another means of knowledge (here, pratyakṣa or direct perception).